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CONTINGENT CONSTITUTIONALITY, LEGISLATIVE 
FACTS, AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW 
MICHAEL T. MORLEY* 
ABSTRACT 
 Many of the Supreme Court’s important holdings concerning campaign finance law are 
not pure matters of constitutional interpretation. Rather, they are “contingent” constitution-
al determinations: the Court’s conclusions rest in substantial part on legislative facts about 
the world that the Court finds, intuits, or assumes to be true. While earlier commentators 
have recognized the need to improve legislative factfinding by the Supreme Court, other 
aspects of its treatment of legislative facts—particularly in the realm of campaign finance—
require reform as well.  
 Stare decisis purportedly insulates the Court’s purely legal holdings and interpretations 
from future challenge. Factually contingent constitutional rulings should, in contrast, be 
more susceptible to future revision. The facts underlying contingent holdings may change, 
litigants in a later case may present different evidence concerning those facts, social or tech-
nological developments may occur, new discoveries may be made, or a later court’s assess-
ments or assumptions concerning those facts may differ. The Court’s campaign finance ju-
risprudence exhibits the opposite tendency of what theory would predict, however. The Court 
has proven much more willing to revisit its purely legal interpretations of the First Amend-
ment than its constitutionally contingent holdings.  
 Many of the Court’s campaign finance rulings pay insufficient attention to the im-
portance of legislative facts. They reiterate holdings of prior cases as if they were pure decla-
rations of law, without recognizing the underlying legislative facts upon which those hold-
ings depend. This can lead future courts to overestimate these holdings’ binding force, over-
looking their dependence on certain facts. Several cases also make critical assertions con-
cerning legislative facts without citing support either in the record or from extrinsic sources.  
 Perhaps the biggest impediment to the effective use of legislative facts in campaign  
finance cases is the vagueness of the decision rules the Court has crafted to implement the 
First Amendment in this field. Many of the Court’s doctrines turn on standards—for exam-
ple, whether an act poses a risk of apparent corruption—that are vague, underdefined, and 
fail to provide litigants and future courts with sufficient guidance concerning the nature 
and extent of evidence necessary to satisfy them. Such indeterminacy allows courts to resolve 
campaign finance cases based primarily on subjective, ad hoc intuitions and preferences 
rather than provable legislative facts.  
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 Much of constitutional law is far less settled than we generally 
take it to be. For example, it is often stated, as a matter of black-
letter law, that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule does not 
prohibit the government from using unconstitutionally seized evi-
dence in grand jury proceedings.1 This declaration, a reflection of the 
Supreme Court’s holding in United States v. Calandra,2 appears to be 
a matter of pure constitutional interpretation—that is, a pure state-
ment of law.  
 That holding, however, is premised on the Calandra Court’s as-
sessment of various facts, including the extent to which applying the 
exclusionary rule in grand jury proceedings would interfere with the 
grand jury’s operations or deter police misconduct.3 Calandra stated, 
“Any incremental deterrent effect which might be achieved  
by extending the rule to grand jury proceedings is uncertain at  
best. . . . [I]t is unrealistic to assume that application of the [exclusion-
ary] rule to grand jury proceedings” would “deter[] . . . police miscon-
duct . . . .”4  
 Thus, the Court’s conclusion does not rest primarily on legal 
grounds, such as the Constitution’s text, structure, or history, but 
rather on its assessment of a few key facts, including the extent to 
which applying the exclusionary rule to grand jury proceedings would 
deter police from engaging in unconstitutional searches. That fact 
                                                                                                                                       
 1. See, e.g., United States v. R. Enters., 498 U.S. 292, 298 (1990) (“[T]he Fourth 
Amendment exclusionary rule does not apply to grand jury proceedings.”); Investigations 
and Police Practices, 43 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 3, 241 (2014) (“[T]he government 
may introduce tainted evidence in . . . grand jury proceedings . . . .”); Melanie D. Wilson, An 
Exclusionary Rule for Police Lies, 47 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 24 (2010) (“[T]he exclusionary 
rule . . . . does not preclude the government from using illegally-obtained evidence in grand 
jury proceedings . . . .”).   
 2. 414 U.S. 338, 350-51 (1974).  
 3. Id. at 350 (“Against this potential damage to the role and functions of the grand 
jury, we must weigh the benefits to be derived from this proposed extension of the 
exclusionary rule.”).  
 4. Id. at 351-52.  
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does not arise directly from the Constitution itself, but rather is an 
empirical assessment about the world as it existed at the time of the 
Court’s ruling, and is by no means immutable, or even necessarily 
correct. Indeed, Professor Seth Stoughton, a former police officer, has 
demonstrated that the Supreme Court’s assumptions about police 
officers’ motivations are often faulty and that police frequently con-
duct searches and make arrests to further a wide range of goals other 
than achieving convictions.5   
 Justice Blackmun’s opinion in Ballew v. Georgia presents an even 
more extreme example of the Justices’ reliance on extrinsic facts in 
applying the Constitution.6 The defendant had been convicted of ob-
scenity in state court before a five-member jury.7 He contended that 
his conviction violated the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, 8 
which he argued required a jury of no less than six people in criminal 
cases.9 Justice Blackmun held that, as a matter of fact, “the purpose 
and functioning of the jury in a criminal trial is seriously impaired, 
and to a constitutional degree, by a reduction in size to below six 
members.”10 Citing over nineteen sources, including books, studies, 
articles, and student notes,11 he stated that empirical data suggests 
that “progressively smaller juries are less likely to foster effective 
group deliberation,”12 “the accuracy of the results achieved by smaller 
and smaller panels” is doubtful,13 and “verdicts of jury deliberation in 
criminal cases will vary . . . to the detriment of . . . the defense” as 
“juries become smaller.”14 His interpretation and application of the 
Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial rested primarily on this empir-
ical research concerning group decision-making, rather than the text, 
original understanding, or history of application of the Sixth 
Amendment itself.15  
                                                                                                                                       
 5. Seth W. Stoughton, Policing Facts, 88 TUL. L. REV. 847, 852 (2014) (“[T]here are 
no formal mechanisms that would encourage officers to reevaluate the quality of their 
arrests based on the conviction results, and informal pressures actively discourage officer 
interest, leading officers to pay less attention to convictions than the Court assumes.”).  
 6. 435 U.S. 223 (1978) (plurality opinion).  
 7. Id. at 226-27.  
 8. U.S. CONST. amend. VI, XIV.  
 9. Ballew, 435 U.S. at 227 (plurality opinion). 
 10. Id. at 239.  
 11. Id. at 231 n.10.  
 12. Id. at 232.  
 13. Id. at 234. 
 14. Id. at 236.  
 15. Id. at 232-34; see also Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159 (2007) (upholding a 
ban on partial-birth abortions based in part on the Court’s assumption that, despite the 
absence of “reliable data to measure the phenomenon,” it is “unexceptionable to conclude 
some women come to regret their choice to abort the infant life they once created and 
sustained” and that “[s]evere depression and loss of esteem can follow”).  
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 Not all constitutional holdings share this dynamic. For example, 
in Mahler v. Eby, the Court held that the Ex Post Facto Clause16 did 
not preclude the petitioners from being deported under an amended 
immigration law based on crimes for which they had been convicted 
before the law’s enactment.17 Citing the Court’s prior interpretation 
of the Ex Post Facto Clause in Calder v. Bull, Mahler declared, “The 
inhibition against the passage of an ex post facto law . . . applies only 
to criminal laws and not to a deportation act like this.”18 The Court 
adjudicated this issue solely as a matter of law, based exclusively on 
the Immigration Act and Ex Post Facto Clause, without taking into 
account any empirical facts, generalizations, or assumptions about 
the world.  
 All of these cases resulted in holdings that appear to provide de-
finitive interpretations or applications of the Constitution. Calandra 
holds that the government may use unconstitutionally seized evi-
dence in grand jury proceedings.19 Ballew declares that the Sixth 
Amendment prohibits states from using a five-person petit jury in a 
criminal case.20 Mahler concludes that the Ex Post Facto Clause does 
not bar the government from designating certain crimes as deporta-
ble offenses after they already have been committed.21 The first two 
holdings, however, depend in large part on empirical, and potentially 
changing (or even incorrect) facts about the world beyond the four 
corners and legislative history of the constitutional clause  
at issue.  
 This Article introduces the phrase “contingent constitutionality” to 
refer to a constitutional holding that is based substantially upon—
that is, contingent upon—potentially falsifiable facts about the world, 
commonly called “legislative facts.”22 As a matter of law, contingent 
constitutional holdings should be treated as far less settled than 
purely legal holdings (i.e., those based solely on the text, structure, 
original intent or understanding, or history of application of the con-
stitutional or legal provision at issue), and courts should be more 
willing to reconsider them. The facts underlying contingent constitu-
tional holdings may change, litigants in a later case may present dif-
                                                                                                                                       
 16. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3. 
 17. 264 U.S. 32, 39 (1924).  
 18. Id. (citation omitted) (citing Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798)).  
 19. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 350-51 (1974).  
 20. Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 239 (1978). 
 21. Mahler, 264 U.S. at 39.  
 22. See infra notes 44-47 and accompanying text; cf. Robert E. Keeton, Legislative 
Facts and Similar Things: Deciding Disputed Premise Facts, 73 MINN. L. REV. 1, 14 (1988) 
(“Underlying every decision of an issue of law is a set of factual premises.”). See generally 
Dean Alfange, Jr., The Relevance of Legislative Facts in Constitutional Law, 114 U. PA. L. 
REV. 637, 640 (1966). 
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ferent evidence concerning those facts, social change or technological 
developments may occur, new discoveries may be made, or a later 
court’s assessments or assumptions concerning those facts may  
differ. 
 As holdings of prior cases are repeated in treatises, hornbooks, 
articles, and subsequent cases, in isolation from the reasoning of the 
underlying opinions, however, contingent constitutional rulings often 
come to be treated as direct interpretations of the Constitution itself 
that do not rest on intermediary factual findings or assumptions.23 
Conversely, subsequent cases instead sometimes treat the factual 
underpinnings of precedents as established legal principles, rather 
than purportedly empirical statements or assumptions about the 
world that are potentially susceptible to counterproof.24  
 This Article offers an analysis of contingent constitutionality, par-
ticularly in the campaign finance context.25 Part II begins by explor-
ing the concept of contingent constitutionality in greater depth, 
demonstrating that many important constitutional holdings rest on 
legislative facts that are subject to continued change, evolving under-
standings, and new evidence. It contends that the judiciary, and in 
particular the Supreme Court, should be more careful to ensure that 
its discussions of case holdings distinguish between those which are 
pure matters of law, and those which are contingent upon potentially 
changing extrinsic facts. Part II further contends that courts should 
be more willing to overturn contingent constitutional rulings than 
those involving primarily legal determinations. Moreover, when 
crafting legal tests and doctrines for applying constitutional provi-
sions (i.e., constitutional decision rules),26 the Court should consider 
whether it is reasonably possible for litigants to prove, or even pro-
vide meaningful evidence concerning, the legislative facts upon which 
those decision rules rely.  
                                                                                                                                       
 23. See, e.g., FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 161 (2003) (“[R]estrictions on political 
contributions have been treated as merely ‘marginal’ speech restrictions subject to 
relatively complaisant review under the First Amendment, because contributions lie closer 
to the edges than to the core of political expression.”); see also FEC v. Mass. Citizens for 
Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 259-60 (1986) (“We have consistently held that restrictions on 
contributions require less compelling justification than restrictions on independent 
spending.”). 
 24. See, e.g., Am. Tradition P’ship v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490, 2491 (2012) (citing Citi-
zens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 342, 343 (2010)); Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 
U.S. 377, 395-97 (2000) (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 21 (1976)); McConnell v. FEC, 
540 U.S. 93, 135-36 (2003) (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21).  
 25. Other scholars, calling for reform of appellate courts’ factfinding, have identified 
campaign finance jurisprudence as an area in which the Court relies on factual findings 
and assumptions in crafting constitutional doctrine. See, e.g., Brianne J. Gorod, The 
Adversarial Myth: Appellate Court Extra-Record Factfinding, 61 DUKE L.J. 1, 28-31 (2011). 
 26. See infra note 32 and accompanying text.  
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 Part III turns to the specific context of campaign finance law, distinguish-
ing the Court’s pure constitutional holdings from its contingent constitutional 
holdings. This Part argues that, in the campaign finance context, the Court 
has failed to recognize the importance of contingent constitutionality by re-
fusing to reassess earlier cases’ contingent constitutional holdings based on 
new or different evidence in subsequent cases. If anything, campaign finance 
jurisprudence exhibits the opposite tendency: the Court has been far 
more willing to readjust its purely legal interpretations of the First 
Amendment than it has been to revisit its factually contingent hold-
ings. 27  Moreover, the Court’s decision rules for applying the First 
Amendment in campaign finance cases have provided very little guid-
ance to litigants concerning the nature and extent of evidence necessary 
to satisfy them. This Part explores these issues in three main areas of 
campaign finance law: the Court’s refusal to recognize proxy speech as 
pure speech entitled to full constitutional protection,28 its holdings con-
cerning the validity of various contribution limits,29 and its declaration 
that independent expenditures do not give rise to a risk of corruption.30  
 Part IV briefly concludes, arguing that the Court must be more atten-
tive to the role of legislative facts in campaign finance cases. In particu-
lar, it should be willing to reassess its contingent constitutional rulings 
in this field in the face of new evidence in subsequent cases.   
II.   CONTINGENT CONSTITUTIONALITY 
 At the foundation of every constitutional ruling lie operative prop-
ositions: pure statements of law in which the Court interprets the 
Constitution’s meaning. 31  Typically, an operative proposition is a 
statement of the general principle that a constitutional provision em-
bodies. For example, the Supreme Court has held that the First 
Amendment guarantees fundamental rights of political speech and 
association.32   
 Many scholars contend that most constitutional rulings also are 
based on decision rules: judicially created tests that courts employ to 
determine whether the underlying operative propositions have been 
                                                                                                                                       
 27. See infra note 85. 
 28. See infra Section III.A.  
 29. See infra Section III.B.  
 30. See infra Section III.C.  
 31. Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1, 9 (2004); see 
Jennifer E. Laurin, Rights Translation and Remedial Disequilibration in Constitutional 
Criminal Procedure, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1002, 1007 (2010).  
 32. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 431 (1963); see also Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 
393, 403 (2007) (“Political speech, of course, is at the core of what the First Amendment is 
designed to protect.”).  
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violated.33 For example, the Supreme Court has held that laws which 
substantially burden pure speech are “subject to strict scrutiny,” 
meaning they are valid only if they are narrowly tailored to serve a 
compelling governmental interest.34 More limited restrictions on First 
Amendment activities, in contrast, are subject only to a “rigorous” 
form of intermediate scrutiny,35 requiring the government to demon-
strate that they are reasonably tailored to further an important in-
terest.36  
 Stare decisis insulates both operative propositions and decision 
rules, to a substantial extent, from subsequent changes.37 It counsels 
that “an argument that [the Court] got something wrong—even a 
good argument to that effect—cannot by itself justify scrapping set-
tled precedent.”38 The Court has described stare decisis as “a founda-
tion stone of the rule of law.”39 Although stare decisis is “not an inex-
orable command,”40  departure from the doctrine “demands special 
justification,”41 particularly where a principle has been applied in a 
“long line of precedents.”42  
 Most constitutional decision rules require the Court to assess  
certain facts. 43  A legal provision’s constitutionality seldom hinges 
                                                                                                                                       
 33. Berman, supra note 31, at 9; Laurin, supra note 31, at 1007-08. While the dispute 
is immaterial to this Article, some scholars question whether it is accurate, meaningful, or 
possible to distinguish between operative propositions and decision rules. See David A. 
Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 190, 207-08 (1988). 
 34. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010). 
 35. McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1444-45 (2014); accord Buckley v. Valeo, 424 
U.S. 1, 29 (1976).  
 36. See Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 358 (1997); Buckley, 
424 U.S. at 25.  
 37. Some commentators have argued that stare decisis applies with greater force to 
operative principles than decision rules, since operative principles are the result of pure 
constitutional interpretation, whereas decision rules are based in part on practical 
implementation concerns. See Berman, supra note 31, at 113.  
 38. Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2409 (2015).  
 39. Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2036 (2014); see also 
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172 (1989) (describing stare decisis as “a 
basic self-governing principle within the Judicial Branch, which is entrusted with the 
sensitive and difficult task of fashioning and preserving a jurisprudential system that is 
not based upon ‘an arbitrary discretion’ ” (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 490 
(Alexander Hamilton) (H. Lodge ed., 1888))).  
 40. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991).  
 41. Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212 (1984).  
 42. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. at 2036. The Court considers several factors in 
determining whether to abandon stare decisis, including whether the precedent has proved 
unworkable, “the antiquity of the precedent, the reliance interests at stake, and of course 
whether the decision was well reasoned.” Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 792-93 
(2009). 
 43. See, e.g., David L. Faigman, “Normative Constitutional Fact-Finding”: Exploring 
the Empirical Component of Constitutional Interpretation, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 551-65 
(1991) (discussing the role of legislative facts in numerous landmark Supreme Court 
precedents); Kenneth L. Karst, Legislative Facts in Constitutional Litigation, 1960 SUP. CT. 
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primarily on “adjudicative facts” about the particular parties that 
happen to be before the Court or the specific incident, instrument,  
or transaction giving rise to the case, however.44 Instead, it usually 
depends on facts about the world, collectively called “legislative 
facts.”45 These include facts about how people typically think, act, or 
feel under certain circumstances; the likely consequences of different 
incentives or courses of action; and social meaning.46 “Facts having 
constitutional magnitude range widely, from the effect of a railroad 
licensing requirement on interstate commerce to the nature of 
man.”47 Many legislative facts “are of a complex nature, built on an 
intricate structure of data and inferences.”48  
 When determining adjudicative facts, courts are generally bound 
by the rules of evidence. When determining legislative facts, in con-
trast, a court is neither required to follow the rules of evidence,49  
nor limited to the evidentiary record.50 Rather, it is free to take judi-
                                                                                                                                       
REV. 75, 75 (1960) (“Judges make constitutional law as they make other kinds of law, on 
the basis of facts proved and assumed.”).  
 44. KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 353 (2d ed. 1983). 
Adjudicative facts necessary to resolve constitutional claims are sometimes referred to as 
“constitutional facts,” Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 
229, 230-31 & n.17 (1985), and are subject to de novo review in certain contexts, such as in 
First Amendment cases, see Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114, 117 (1985); see also, e.g., 
Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., 466 U.S. 485, 508 n.27 (1984); Edwards v. South 
Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235 (1963). See generally Adam Hoffman, Note, Corralling 
Constitutional Fact: De Novo Fact Review in the Federal Appellate Courts, 50 DUKE L.J. 
1427 (2001) (identifying various types of cases in which the Supreme Court will review 
constitutional facts de novo). Monaghan contends that federal appellate courts generally 
have discretion to review constitutional facts de novo, but are not required to do so. See 
Monaghan, supra at 276. 
 45. See Karst, supra note 43, at 81, 98; see also Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to 
Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process, 55 HARV. L. REV. 364, 365-66 (1942). 
As with many attempts at categorization in the law, the line between adjudicative and 
legislative facts can sometimes be blurry. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, The Decline of “The 
Record”: A Comment on Posner, 51 DUQ. L. REV. 51, 58-59 (2013) (discussing examples of 
facts that are “neither purely legislative nor purely adjudicative”). 
 46. Some commentators have referred to this category of facts as “social facts.” 
Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Social Facts: Scientific Methodology as Legal Precedent, 
76 CALIF. L. REV. 877, 881 n.26 (1988).  
 47. Faigman, supra note 43, at 551 (footnote omitted).  
 48. Karst, supra note 43, at 100.  
 49. See FED. R. EVID. 201(a) (providing that restrictions on a court’s ability to take 
judicial notice do not extend to legislative facts); Keeton, supra note 22, at 31 (“[B]oth trial 
and appellate courts, in making premise-fact decisions, are free to draw upon sources of 
knowledge not admissible under the formal rules of evidence that apply to adjudicative- 
fact finding.”). 
 50. See Jeffrey C. Dobbins, New Evidence on Appeal, 96 MINN. L. REV. 2016, 2045 
(2012) (“[F]ar more common is a willingness by appellate courts to consider new evidence 
on legislative facts at every turn . . . .”); Gorod, supra note 25, at 6 (“[N]othing in the 
current legal framework prevents a higher court from looking outside the record created by 
the parties and relying on its own factual findings to reverse the trial court’s decision.”).  
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cial notice of whatever legislative facts it wishes,51 and an appellate  
court need not defer to a lower court’s findings on those issues.52 The 
Advisory Committee note to the Federal Rules of Evidence explains 
that a judge is “unrestricted in his investigation and conclusion” 
when determining legislative facts.53 “He may make an independent 
search for persuasive data, or rest content with what he has or what 
the parties present.”54   
 In general, the Court is likely to begin by scrutinizing the eviden-
tiary record that the parties assembled below,55 as well as their briefs 
on appeal. Briefs that focus on presenting legislative facts often are 
referred to as “Brandeis briefs,” after Louis Brandeis’ famous brief in 
Muller v. Oregon56 containing over 100 pages of social science data 
and other evidence concerning the consequences of long working 
hours on women.57  
 In important constitutional cases, the Court typically receives 
numerous amicus briefs containing legislative facts, as well.58 The 
Supreme Court virtually never denies leave to file an amicus brief.59 
“In a recent term, . . . a total of 399 amicus briefs were filed in 74 of 
the 79 cases decided. . . . Four or more amicus briefs were filed in 
over half of the decided cases.”60 Many of these briefs, akin to Brande-
                                                                                                                                       
 51. Dobbins, supra note 50, at 2044; see also Schauer, supra note 45, at 58 (“[T]he 
phenomenon of reliance on external information to establish legislative facts has long been 
part of the appellate landscape.”). See generally Allison Orr Larsen, Confronting Supreme 
Court Fact Finding, 98 VA. L. REV. 1255 (2012) (providing an empirical examination of the 
extent to which the Supreme Court conducts independent factual research).   
 52. See Keeton, supra note 22, at 41-43; see also Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 
168 n.3 (1986); Caitlin E. Borgmann, Appellate Review of Social Facts in Constitutional 
Rights Cases, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 1185, 1188, 1190 (2013) (recognizing that it is “widely 
believed” that appellate courts may review social facts “independently,” but arguing that 
district courts’ findings concerning social facts should be subject to clearly erroneous 
review).  
 53. FED. R. EVID. 201(a) adv. comm. note (quoting Edmund M. Morgan, Judicial 
Notice, 57 HARV. L. REV. 269, 270-71 (1944)); see also Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U.S. 
543, 548 (1924) (“[T]he Court may ascertain as it sees fit any fact that is merely a ground 
for laying down a rule of law.”).  
 54. FED. R. EVID. 201(a) adv. comm. note (quoting Morgan, supra note 53, at 270-71).  
 55. Ann Woolhandler emphasizes that litigants have a strong incentive to provide the 
Court with as much supporting evidence as they can concerning pertinent legislative facts. 
Ann Woolhandler, Rethinking the Judicial Reception of Legislative Facts, 41 VAND. L. REV. 
111, 118, 121 (1988). 
 56. 208 U.S. 412 (1908).  
 57. Dobbins, supra note 50, at 2049-50. See generally Marion E. Doro, The Brandeis 
Brief, 11 VAND. L. REV. 783 (1958). Some commentators have critiqued Brandeis briefs 
precisely because appellate courts can use them to adjudicate cases based on new facts that 
were not introduced in the district court. See John Frazier Jackson, The Brandeis Brief—
Too Little, Too Late: The Trial Court as a Superior Forum for Presenting Legislative Facts, 
17 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 1, 5 (1993).  
 58. See Dobbins, supra note 50, at 2051-54.  
 59. See STEPHEN M. SHAPIRO ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 751 (2013). 
 60. Id. at 756.  
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is briefs, presented the Court with legislative facts from outside the 
record. 61  Professor Allison Larsen’s empirical research identifies 
problems with the Court’s reliance on amici.62 She demonstrates that 
a substantial number of amicus briefs “cite a study that [the amicus] 
funded itself,” assert facts based on information that is not publicly 
accessible, or present evidence based on “methods which have been 
seriously questioned by others working in the field.”63  
 Larsen’s research further demonstrates that the Court also fre-
quently uses the Internet to conduct its own “in house” research into 
legislative facts “without reliance on the parties or amici—at an 
astonishing rate.”64 The Court may be more willing to rely on such 
independent research in civil liberties cases than ones that turn pri-
marily on economic issues.65 Many commentators, including Larsen, 
have questioned the reliability of independent factual research that 
judges perform themselves.66 She points out that the identities, quali-
fications, and biases of the authors of many websites, such as Wik-
ipedia, often cannot be readily determined, and the websites’ content 
is not subject to adversarial testing.67 And judges sometimes do not 
even bother doing such research, instead deciding cases based on 
their own assumptions and intuitions about legislative facts.68  
                                                                                                                                       
 61. Allison Orr Larsen, The Trouble with Amicus Facts, 100 VA. L. REV. 1757, 1773 
(2014); see also Gorod, supra note 25, at 35-37 (discussing the Supreme Court’s receptivity 
to amicus briefs to help it engage in extra-record factfinding).  
 62. Larsen, supra note 61, at 1764. 
 63. Id.; see also Borgmann, supra note 52, at 1216 (contending that amicus briefs 
often contain “dubious factual assertions”). 
 64. Larsen, supra note 51, at 1262; accord Dobbins, supra note 50, at 2057; Gorod, 
supra note 25, at 57.  
 65. Karst, supra note 43, at 96.  
 66. See, e.g., Larsen, supra note 51, at 1262-63 (pointing out that independent judicial 
factfinding creates risks including “the possibility of mistake, unfairness to the parties, and 
judicial enshrinement of biased data”); Layne S. Keele, When the Mountain Goes to 
Mohammed: The Internet and Judicial Decision-Making, 45 N.M. L. REV. 125, 149-51 
(2014); see also Peggy C. Davis, “There is a Book Out . . . ”: An Analysis of Judicial 
Absorption of Legislative Facts, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1539, 1542 (1987) (arguing that courts’ 
assessment of legislative facts is “often superficial” and “deeply problematic”); Gorod, supra 
note 25, at 9, 11; cf. Coleen M. Barger, On the Internet, Nobody Knows You’re a Judge: 
Appellate Courts’ Use of Internet Materials, 4 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 417 (2002) 
(outlining concerns with courts’ factual research on the Internet); Maurice Rosenberg, 
Improving the Courts’ Ability to Absorb Scientific Information, in SCIENCE AND 
TECHNOLOGY ADVICE TO THE PRESIDENT, CONGRESS, AND JUDICIARY 480, 482 (William T. 
Golden ed., 1988) (“The judiciary’s current method of absorbing scientific information on 
legislative facts is haphazard, unruly and unreliable.”). Keeton has a more sanguine view 
about the reliability of the judiciary’s factfinding capabilities concerning legislative facts, 
though he recommends certain procedures to help ensure the accuracy of their findings. 
Keeton, supra note 22 at 46-48.  
 67. Larsen, supra note 51, at 1262-63. 
 68. See Faigman, supra note 43, at 544-45; Gorod, supra note 25, at 56-57 (recognizing 
that judges “may assume that a particular belief is established ‘fact’ even when there is no 
basis for that assumption”); Larsen, supra note 51, at 1260 (recognizing that a court “can 
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 Unlike courts’ legal interpretations, the factual premises of their 
rulings are not subject to stare decisis.69 As Kurst explains, “Much of 
the law’s vitality comes from the willingness of courts to re-examine 
findings of legislative fact to a far greater extent than they re-
examine other propositions of law.”70 Litigants therefore should have 
the opportunity to challenge the legislative facts upon which a pur-
portedly binding precedent is based, as a way of demonstrating that 
it is no longer valid.71 
 When courts, commentators, and litigants fail to distinguish be-
tween constitutional holdings that are based on pure interpretations 
of law, and those that rest in large part on legislative facts, they in-
advertently overestimate the binding nature of the latter by overlook-
ing the factual contingencies upon which they are based. And even 
when lower courts recognize that the Supreme Court’s holdings are 
based on certain legislative facts, they might feel bound to continue 
accepting those legislative facts as true, even in future cases that in-
volve different legal provisions and litigants, despite record evidence 
to the contrary.72  
 If litigants present evidence concerning a legislative fact that the 
Supreme Court did not consider, a later court should determine 
whether it affects the Court’s holding, rather than waiting the years 
or decades it might otherwise take for the Court itself to reconsider 
the issue. Likewise, as social changes, technological advances, new 
research, or other developments undermine the legislative facts upon 
which a ruling is based, courts should be willing to reassess whether 
the factual premises, and therefore the holding, of a precedent re-
main valid. As Professor Stuart Minor Benjamin explains, “Appellate 
opinions are only as robust as the facts on which they are based. 
When those facts evaporate, the opinion on which they rest is weak-
ened as well.”73 
                                                                                                                                       
simply assert an emphatic view of [a] fact with nothing to support the view except for 
‘common experience’ ”).  
 69. See Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 266 (1986) (holding that stare decisis does 
not apply when “the Court has felt obliged ‘to bring its opinions into agreement with 
experience and with facts newly ascertained’ ” (quoting Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 
285 U.S. 393, 412 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting))); cf. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. 
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 860 (1992) (“[N]o change in Roe’s factual underpinning has left its 
central holding obsolete, and none supports an argument for overruling it.”).  
 70. Karst, supra note 43, at 108.  
 71. Id. at 109.  
 72. Kenneth Culp Davis, Judicial Notice, 55 COLUM. L. REV. 945, 970 (1955); Gorod, 
supra note 25, at 57, 64 (calling for lower courts to decline to apply findings of legislative 
facts from higher courts’ precedents that appear incorrect). 
 73. Stuart Minor Benjamin, Stepping into the Same River Twice: Rapidly Changing 
Facts and the Appellate Process, 78 TEX. L. REV. 269, 272 (1999). 
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 The Supreme Court reserves to itself the “prerogative of overrul-
ing its own decisions” when they rest on “reasons rejected in some 
other line of decisions.”74 But this principle does not compel a future 
court to follow a precedent that rests on facts that, based on the evi-
dence before it, do not appear true. As is often the case with constitu-
tional interpretation, this power may be abused, but it is a problem 
that the Supreme Court may readily resolve through summary rever-
sals and remands.  
 It might be objected that emphasizing the contingent nature of 
precedents undermines their practical utility, because future liti-
gants would be freer to challenge their factual underpinnings. 75 
When a constitutional holding is based on certain legislative facts, 
however, it is more faithful to the underlying decision rule for future 
courts to confirm that those facts exist or continue to exist, rather 
than relying on the Supreme Court’s findings, assumptions, or intui-
tions concerning those facts in a previous case, potentially from dec-
ades earlier. If the Court finds itself in persistent disagreement with 
lower courts over the existence of particular legislative facts, the 
Court might consider either reformulating its description of those 
facts or modifying the decision rule to focus on different facts. Alter-
natively, if the Court wishes for a principle to apply regardless of 
whether a particular legislative fact is actually true, it should impose 
that principle as a matter of law—that is, as a matter of pure consti-
tutional interpretation—without purporting to make it contingent 
upon a factual condition.    
 At a minimum, the Supreme Court itself should be willing to over-
turn a ruling that is contingent on legislative facts it no longer ac-
cepts as true. For the Court to be in a position to do so, it must:  
(i) be clear about which holdings are purely the result of direct con-
stitutional interpretation, and which are contingent on legislative 
facts; (ii) craft constitutional decision rules that identify the legisla-
tive facts upon which its rulings are based in terms that give mean-
ingful guidance to both litigants and future courts, rather than rely-
ing on vague standards that implicitly encourage future courts to rely 
on intuition; and (iii) avoid treating findings of legislative fact in 
precedents as assertions of law that carry binding force in subse-
quent cases.   
                                                                                                                                       
 74. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989); 
accord United States v. O’Brien, 560 U.S. 218, 224 (2010).  
 75. See Benjamin, supra note 73, at 287 (recognizing that focusing on the facts 
underlying constitutional rulings “undercut[s] the seeming permanence of appellate 
decisions”).  
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III.   LEGISLATIVE FACTS AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE 
 Modern campaign finance law is built around the fundamental 
constitutional distinction between political contributions and inde-
pendent expenditures.76 The Court has held that limits on contribu-
tions to candidates, political parties, and PACs impose only limited 
burdens on First Amendment rights and therefore are subject only to 
intermediate scrutiny.77 Contribution limits generally survive such 
scrutiny because they are reasonably tailored to furthering the gov-
ernment’s interest in fighting actual and apparent quid pro quo cor-
ruption.78 Independent expenditures, in contrast, are funds that a 
person spends on political communications about federal elections 
without direct or indirect suggestions, guidance, or input from a can-
didate or political party.79 Broadly speaking, the Supreme Court has 
held that, because independent expenditures constitute pure speech, 
limits upon them are subject to strict scrutiny and are almost invari-
ably unconstitutional.80   
 This dichotomy between political contributions and independent 
expenditures relies extensively on legislative facts. 81  The Court’s  
                                                                                                                                       
 76. See generally Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).  
 77. See id. at 26-28. 
 78. Id. But see McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1442 (2014) (holding that aggre-
gate contribution limits are unconstitutional); Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 262 (2006) 
(“[T]he specific details of Act 64’s contribution limits require us to hold that those limits 
violate the First Amendment, for they burden First Amendment interests in a manner that 
is disproportionate to the public purposes they were enacted to advance.”); McConnell v. 
FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 231-32 (2003) (invalidating prohibition on political contributions by  
minors).  
 79. 52 U.S.C. § 30101(17) (Supp. II 2014). 
 80. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 45-51; see also infra notes 179-92. But see Bluman v. FEC, 
800 F. Supp. 2d 281, 288 & n.3 (D.D.C. 2011) (three-judge court) (upholding law prohibit-
ing foreign nationals other than lawful permanent residents from making independent 
expenditures in connection with federal elections), aff’d without opinion, 132 S. Ct. 1087 
(2012).  
 81. Most broadly, Buckley and its progeny rest on some general and largely 
unobjectionable factual assertions about the importance of free political discussions in 
maintaining a vibrant democratic government. 424 U.S. at 14 (“Discussion of public issues 
and debate on the qualifications of candidates are integral to the operation of the system of 
government established by our Constitution.”). Justices have expressed similar sentiments 
throughout the Court’s history. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 
U.S. 503, 512 (1969) (declaring that a “robust exchange of ideas” leads to the “discover[y of] 
truth”); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (agreeing 
that “freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to 
the discovery and spread of political truth”). Of course, as an empirical matter, it is 
debatable whether full and robust political debate actually leads to a better-informed 
electorate. See Derek E. Bambauer, Shopping Badly: Cognitive Biases, Communications, 
and the Fallacy of the Marketplace of Ideas, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 649, 651 (2006) 
(“[R]esearch in cognitive psychology and behavioral economics shows that humans operate 
with significant, persistent perceptual biases that skew our interactions with information. 
These biases undercut the assumption that people reliably sift data to find truth.”).  
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rulings in this area, however, often fail to identify the evidentiary or 
other basis that supports the Court’s findings. 82  And subsequent  
cases often fail to distinguish between holdings that are pure inter-
pretations of law and those that were contingent upon potentially 
changing facts.83  
 As discussed above,84 sitting Justices might be particularly unwill-
ing to revisit their purely legal interpretations of the First Amend-
ment, especially due to stare decisis. Attacks on precedents’ factual 
underpinnings, particularly attacks based on evidence the Court did 
not previously consider, conceptually represent the most viable ap-
proach for seeking change. Several of the findings or assumptions 
upon which the Court has based its holdings in campaign finance 
cases are, at a minimum, dubious and potentially susceptible to coun-
                                                                                                                                       
 A large body of empirical research suggests that exposure to accurate evidence or data 
often does not lead people to change their beliefs and can even cause them to cling to 
contrary beliefs with even greater intensity. See, e.g., Brendan Nyhan & Jason Reifler, 
When Corrections Fail: The Persistence of Political Misperceptions, 32 POL. BEHAV. 303, 304 
(2010); Monica Prasad et al., “There Must Be a Reason”: Osama, Saddam, and Inferred 
Justification, 79 SOC. INQUIRY 142, 144, 148, 153 (2009). Further reducing the efficacy of 
political dialogue is what Dan Kahan and Donald Braman term “cultural cognition”: a 
“series of interlocking social and psychological mechanisms that induce individuals to 
conform their factual beliefs about contested policies to their cultural evaluations of the 
activities subject to regulation.” Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, Cultural Cognition and 
Public Policy, 24 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 149, 171 (2006). They argue that, “[b]ecause cultural 
cognition determines what sorts of information individuals find reliable, culturally polarized 
beliefs . . . stubbornly persist in the face of scientific advances in understanding.” Id.  
 Cognitive biases such as confirmation bias also can limit the impact of political debate. 
See, e.g., Mary Nicol Bowman, Mitigating Foul Blows, 49 GA. L. REV. 309, 329 (2015); 
Charles G. Lord et al., Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization: The Effects of Prior 
Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 2098, 
2098 (1979). Molly Wilson has warned that political campaigns actively take advantage of 
voters’ cognitive biases, rather than attempting to persuade them through reason and 
evidence. Molly J. Walker Wilson, Behavioral Decision Theory and Implications for the 
Supreme Court’s Campaign Finance Jurisprudence, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 679 (2010).  
 Political discussions among like-minded people might lead them further from accurate 
conclusions in other ways. Rather than facilitating the determination of truth, collective 
deliberations can lead to the adoption of more extreme beliefs. See Cass R. Sunstein, 
Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YALE L.J. 71, 88-90 (2000). And to 
the extent that liberal and conservative beliefs are partly a function of brain anatomy or 
functioning, robust expression and political debates may not affect people’s beliefs much at 
all. See, e.g., David M. Amodio et al., Neurocognitive Correlates of Liberalism and 
Conservativism, 10 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 1246, 1247 (2007); Ryota Kanai et al., Political 
Orientations Are Correlated with Brain Structure in Young Adults, 21 CURRENT BIOLOGY 
677 (2011).  
 Thus, while the Court’s assumption that robust political debate will facilitate the 
determination of truth appears facially reasonable, it is the kind of reflexive, intuitive 
assertion that empirical research suggests, at a minimum, is likely overbroad and 
somewhat inaccurate. It is the type of legal fiction, however, that the Court has strong 
institutional reasons to accept as true, notwithstanding any counterproof.  
 82. See, e.g., McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1452; Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47. 
 83. See, e.g., SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686, 689 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (en banc). 
 84. See supra Part II. 
2016]  CONTINGENT CONSTITUTIONALITY 693 
 
terproof in subsequent litigation. It bears emphasis, however, that 
the Court’s rulings in this area have been the opposite of what one 
might expect. It has shown greater willingness to revisit its purely 
legal interpretations of the Constitution than the factual underpin-
nings of holdings that are contingent on critical legislative facts.85  
 The Court’s campaign finance jurisprudence also demonstrates 
the importance of establishing constitutional decision rules that are 
susceptible to meaningful proof, rather than calling for courts to base 
their rulings in substantial part on guesses, intuitions, stereotypes, 
or assumptions. In crafting many of its decision rules in this area, it 
appears that the Court failed to consider the extent to which various 
legislative facts can be concretely proven or the quantum or type of 
evidence that would be sufficient to establish (or disprove) such 
facts.86 Clearer, more specific constitutional decision rules would help 
litigants develop their cases and allow future courts to adjudicate 
campaign finance challenges more objectively.  
 This Part explores these issues as they arise in three different 
contexts in campaign finance law. Section A explores the Court’s 
holding that political contributions are entitled to minimal constitu-
tional protection as a type of speech. Section B discusses the Court’s 
rulings concerning the validity (or invalidity) of various types of re-
strictions on political contributions. Finally, Section C analyzes the 
Court’s conclusion that independent expenditures generally cannot 
be limited because they do not pose a risk of corruption.  
A.   Political Contributions as Speech 
 One of the core tenets of campaign finance jurisprudence over the 
past forty years has been the Court’s holding that contribution limits 
abridge First Amendment rights to a lesser extent than restrictions 
on independent expenditures (i.e., pure political speech) and there-
fore are subject only to intermediate scrutiny.87 In Buckley v. Valeo, 
the Court held that a contribution limit “entails only a 
                                                                                                                                       
 85. Compare McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 152-54 (2003) (holding that the 
government’s compelling interest in preventing corruption extends to preventing the 
“purchase [of] influence” and the “sale of access” to officeholders), with Citizens United v. 
FEC, 558 U.S 310, 359-60 (2010) (“The fact that speakers may have influence over or 
access to elected officials does not mean that these officials are corrupt . . . . Ingratiation 
and access . . . are not corruption.”).  
 86. See infra Sections III.B, III.C. 
 87. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21-22.  
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marginal restriction” on freedom of expression, as well as a more 
substantial restriction on freedom of association (though not enough 
to trigger full constitutional protection).88  
 The Court’s conclusion that political contributions entail only a 
minimal communicative element is based on a mix of pure legal prin-
ciples and conceptually falsifiable legislative facts. First, the Court 
noted that “[a] contribution serves as a general expression of support 
for the candidate and his views, but does not communicate the under-
lying basis for the support.”89 This is definitionally true and does not 
appear susceptible of empirical proof or disproof. Even if a contribu-
tor writes a note in the memo field of a check to explain why she is 
providing the contribution, the contribution itself—the funds being 
given to the candidate—does not convey that information. It is un-
clear, however, whether the vagueness of the expression that a con-
tribution embodies remains constitutionally significant from a purely 
legal perspective. Nearly a quarter-century after Buckley, the Court 
held in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of 
Boston that:  
[A] narrow, succinctly articulable message is not a condition of 
constitutional protection, which if confined to expressions convey-
ing a “particularized message,” would never reach the unquestion-
ably shielded painting of Jackson Pollock, music of Arnold Schoen-
berg, or Jabberwocky verse of Lewis Carroll.90 
 Second, the Buckley Court stated that the amount a person con-
tributes does not send a meaningful message about the extent of his 
or her support for the candidate.91 “At most,” the Court opined, “the 
size of the contribution provides a very rough index of the intensity of 
the contributor’s support.”92 The Court added that to determine the 
“intensity” of a contributor’s support for a candidate based on the 
amount of his contribution, it would also be necessary to consider his 
“financial ability and his past contribution history.”93   
 These legislative facts appear highly debatable and might reason-
ably be subject to counterproof in future litigation. Litigants might  
be able to present public opinion surveys to demonstrate that most 
members of the public draw a strong correlation between the amount 
a person contributes to a candidate and the extent to which that  
                                                                                                                                       
 88. Id.; see also id. at 22 (recognizing that a contribution “serves to affiliate a person 
with a candidate” and “enables like-minded persons to pool their resources in furtherance 
of common political goals”).   
 89. Id. at 21.  
 90. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 569 
(1995) (citation omitted).  
 91. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 20-21.  
 92. Id. at 21.  
 93. Id. at 21 n.22.  
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person “really” supports the candidate. Likewise, litigants could like-
ly adduce evidence that most political parties and candidates regard 
people who contribute higher amounts as their strongest supporters. 
Indeed, many fundraising materials aimed at high-dollar contribu-
tors contain language to that effect.94 
 It is far from intuitive that a $20 contribution sends substantially 
the same message as a $2700 contribution. Political contributions 
present a clear case of “putting your money where your mouth is.” 
Talk is cheap; a verbal expression of support often may seem far less 
meaningful or significant than a monetary contribution. It is at least 
reasonably possible that evidence in a subsequent case may lead the 
Court to conclude that it underestimated the communicative value of 
political contributions.   
 Third, and perhaps most significantly, the Court reasoned that 
contributions are distinguishable from speech because, although they 
“may result in political expression” if the recipient spends the funds 
“to present views to the voters, the transformation of contributions 
into political debate involves speech by someone other than the con-
tributor.”95 California Medical Association (“CalMed”) v. FEC elabo-
rated that a person cannot claim full First Amendment protection for 
facilitating “proxy speech,” or speech by other people with which they 
agree.96 The CalMed Court explained that a “sympathy of interests 
alone does not convert” speech by the recipient of a contribution into 
that of the contributor.97   
 This principle may be the most vulnerable part of the Court’s 
analysis of contribution limits. Buckley elsewhere holds that the act 
of spending money to subsidize speech may itself be treated as pure 
speech. As the Court said of independent expenditures, “[T]he de-
pendence of a communication on the expenditure of money [does not] 
operate[] itself to introduce a nonspeech element or to reduce the ex-
acting scrutiny required by the First Amendment.” 98  The reduced 
constitutional protection for contributions therefore does not stem 
from the fact that the contributor must spend money to subsidize the 
recipient’s political speech, but rather that the contributor is seeking 
to subsidize and adopt someone else’s message.  
                                                                                                                                       
 94. See, e.g., Maggie Haberman, Clinton Fund-Raising, for Starters, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 
12, 2015, 7:43 PM), http://www.nytimes.com/politics/first-draft/2015/04/12/clinton-fund-
raising-for-starters/?_r=0 (noting that supporters of Hillary Clinton who contributed the 
maximum permissible amount of $2700 would “earn[] . . . status as ‘Hill-starters’ ”).  
 95. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21. 
 96. 453 U.S. 182, 196 (1981) (holding that “speech by proxy” through contributions to 
a PAC “is not the sort of political advocacy that this Court in Buckley found entitled to full 
First Amendment protection”).  
 97. Id.  
 98. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 16.  
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 Future litigants reasonably might be able to introduce expert and 
lay evidence demonstrating that the identity of a speaker can have 
more of an impact on whether an audience accepts a message than 
the content of the message itself. Listeners might be more willing to 
accept certain messages if they come from sources that share their 
values,99 agree with them on most other issues, can speak from per-
sonal experience or knowledge, or otherwise have special credibility. 
Barack Obama can speak about the perceived need for some African-
American men to play a greater role in their children’s lives in a way 
that Mitt Romney, uttering the same words, could not.100 Marco Ru-
bio similarly claimed he was uniquely situated to defend the Republi-
can Party’s policies toward the poor, asking rhetorically, “If I’m our 
nominee, how is Hillary Clinton going to lecture me about living 
paycheck to paycheck?”101 He continued, “I was raised paycheck to 
paycheck. . . . [H]ow is she going to lecture me about student loans? I 
owed over $100,000 just four years ago.”102 More broadly, promises or 
messages directly from candidates may be much more effective than 
the same claims from third parties about those candidates.103  
 Aristotle’s Rhetoric conveyed this idea through the concepts of 
ethos and pathos: appeals to the credibility of the speaker and the 
emotions of the audience, respectively.104 To Aristotle, ethos was ar-
guably the most important aspect of a message.105 The Court likewise 
has recognized that the First Amendment protects the non-
                                                                                                                                       
 99. See Geoffrey L. Cohen, Party over Policy: The Dominating Impact of Group 
Influence on Political Beliefs, 85 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 808 (2003).  
 100. See Julie Bosman, Obama Sharply Assails Absent Black Fathers, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 16, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/16/us/politics/15cnd-obama.html?_r=0  
(“ ‘Too many fathers are M.I.A, too many fathers are AWOL, missing from too many lives 
and too many homes,’ Mr. Obama said . . . . Mr. Obama laid out his case in stark terms 
that would be difficult for a white candidate to make, telling the mostly black audience not 
to ‘just sit in the house watching SportsCenter’ . . . .”); see also Aamer Madhani, Obama: 
There’s No Longer Time for Excuses for Black Men, USA TODAY (May 19,  
2013), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2013/05/19/obama-morehouse-college-
commencement/2324241/ (“Obama spoke in very personal terms to the 500 young men as 
he urged them to . . . become . . . good fathers and good husbands.”).  
 101. James Pindell, 7 Key Moments from the Republican Presidential Debate, BOSTON 
GLOBE (Aug. 7, 2015), https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/politics/2015/08/07/top-moments-
from-republican-presidential-debate/VRNAPmyMtw5mCIZYPHc8RN/story.html.  
 102. Id.  
 103. Federal campaign finance law is premised, in part, on the notion that hearing 
directly from a candidate has special significance. When a candidate takes advantage of 
statutorily reduced rates to run an attack ad on cable television, the commercial must end 
with either a “full-screen view of the candidate” declaring that she authorized the 
advertisement, or a photograph of the candidate accompanied by a voice-over of the 
candidate conveying that message. 52 U.S.C. § 30120(d)(B)(i) (Supp. II 2014).  
 104. ARISTOTLE, ON RHETORIC 38-39 (George A. Kennedy trans., 2d ed. 2007).  
 105. See id.  
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rational, “emotive” aspects of communications, precisely because they 
“may often be the more important element of the overall message 
sought to be communicated.”106  
 A mailer, television advertisement, or other communication from a 
candidate or party may perfectly and perhaps even uniquely convey a 
potential contributor’s feelings and beliefs. She may wish to subsidize 
further dissemination of that communication (or similar ones), rather 
than attempt to fund her own imitation of it.107 Many such contribu-
tors reasonably might believe that they cannot create their own mail-
ers, websites, or other such communications of comparable efficacy, 
particularly since candidates, political parties, and PACs typically 
employ expensive consultants, public relations firms, and profession-
al writers to prepare their materials.  
 The law of evidence recognizes this phenomenon as an adoptive 
admission. Through her words or actions, a person may embrace a 
third party’s statement as her own, and the statement will be legally 
attributed to her.108 In the unique context of campaign finance juris-
prudence, however, the Court deems such adoptive admissions as a 
less accurate representation of a person’s beliefs, and far  
less worthy of constitutional protection, than the person’s own inde-
pendent speech. Litigants in future cases may reasonably be able to 
compile an evidentiary record to persuasively challenge the Court’s 
conclusion that contributions deserve reduced constitutional protec-
tion because “the transformation of contributions into political debate 
involves speech by someone other than the contributor.”109 
 Finally, the Court concluded that contribution limits impose no 
more than “marginal” restrictions on speech because they do not “in 
any way infringe the contributor’s freedom to discuss candidates and 
issues.”110 The availability of alternate channels of communication  
is a factual issue that appears indisputable. As discussed above, 
however, a person’s physical freedom to personally discuss candi-
dates and issues may not be nearly as meaningful as his ability to 
adopt and facilitate expression by others with whom he agrees. 
                                                                                                                                       
 106. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971). 
 107. See FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Pol. Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 495 (1985) 
(“[C]ontributors obviously like the message they are hearing from these organizations and 
want to add their voices to that message; otherwise they would not part with their 
money.”).  
 108. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(B); United States v. Williams, 445 F.3d 724, 735 (4th 
Cir. 2006) (“The adoptive-admission doctrine permits statements of others to be treated by 
the jury as statements of the party—it is as if the party himself made the statement.”).  
 109. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 21 (1976).   
 110. Id. at 20-21.  
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And the Supreme Court has come to recognize that alternative modes 
of political involvement are seldom practically available when a per-
son has an interest in multiple candidates.111  
 Thus, the Court’s conclusion that political contributions entail on-
ly a minimal expressive element is based on a mix of purely legal 
premises that have been weakened by subsequent holdings and legis-
lative facts that may be open to counterproof in future cases. Post-
Buckley case law has typically minimized or overlooked the factually 
contingent nature of this holding, however. Both the Supreme Court 
and lower courts often reiterate that political contributions involve 
minimal expressive content as if that assertion were a matter of pure 
constitutional law, rather than a conclusion based on the Court’s fac-
tual conclusions in Buckley.112 Based on empirical research, expert 
opinion, and evidence from political candidates and contributors, the 
Court may conclude that either contributions in general, or contribu-
tions specifically to subsidize “speech by proxy” in particular, are en-
titled to full constitutional protection.113 Were the Court to conclude 
that contributions are a fully protected form of speech, contribution 
limits would be subject to strict scrutiny.114  
B.   Limits on Political Contributions 
 The Court’s precedents concerning the constitutionality of contri-
bution limits purport to rest upon legislative facts, but in reality are 
based primarily on ad hoc subjective judgments. The decision rule 
the Court has crafted to determine the validity of contribution limits 
is so vague and underdefined that courts lack sufficient guidance in 
ascertaining whether it has been satisfied, and litigants have little 
direction as to the nature, weight, or extent of evidence they must 
adduce to carry their respective burdens. Moreover, the legislative 
facts that the decision rule treats as dispositive appear to depend 
mostly on judicial intuition.  
 Buckley held that contribution limits are constitutional if they are 
“closely drawn” to furthering the government’s interest in preventing 
                                                                                                                                       
 111. McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1449 (2014) (“[P]ersonal volunteering is not 
a realistic alternative for those who wish to support a wide variety of candidates or causes. 
Other effective methods of supporting preferred candidates or causes without contributing 
money are reserved for a select few, such as entertainers capable of raising hundreds of 
thousands of dollars in a single evening.”). 
 112. See, e.g., id. at 1444.   
 113. Cf. id. at 1462-63 (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that “[n]one of the [Buckley] 
Court’s bases” for concluding “that contributions are different in kind from direct 
expenditures . . . withstands careful review”).  
 114. See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 410 (2000) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting).  
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quid pro quo corruption or the appearance of such corruption. 115  
Applying that standard, the Court upheld the validity of limits on 
contributions to candidates. 116  The Court acknowledged that the  
extent of corruption created by candidate contributions “can never  
be reliably ascertained.”117 It found that the risk of corruption was 
sufficient, however, to warrant contribution limits based on “deeply 
disturbing examples surfacing after the 1972 election” which demon-
strated “that the problem [wa]s not an illusory one.”118 The Court rec-
ognized that quid pro quo bribery was already independently prohib-
ited and that disclosure requirements ensured that the government 
and public would know about any large contributions to a candi-
date.119 It responded that Congress was “entitled” to conclude that 
contribution limits are “a necessary legislative concomitant” to those 
other measures.120   
 Buckley and its progeny leave unsettled a wide variety of issues 
concerning the standard for determining when the specter of corrup-
tion is sufficient to justify particular contribution limits or other such 
restrictions. The Court elaborated in a subsequent case that “[t]he 
quantum of empirical evidence needed to satisfy heightened judicial 
scrutiny of legislative judgments will vary up or down with the novel-
ty and plausibility of the justification raised.”121 It remains unclear, 
                                                                                                                                       
 115. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25. The Court has also identified various interests that are 
constitutionally impermissible rationales for campaign finance restrictions. For example, 
the government may not limit contributions to “equaliz[e] the relative ability of individuals 
and groups to influence the outcome of elections.” Id. at 48. The Court explained that the 
First Amendment prohibits the government from “restrict[ing] the speech of some elements 
of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others.” Id. at 48-49; see also 
McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1450 (“[I]t is not an acceptable governmental objective to ‘level 
the playing field,’ or to ‘level electoral opportunities,’ or to ‘equaliz[e] the financial re-
sources of candidates.’ ” (second alteration in original) (first quoting Ariz. Free Enter. 
Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2811 (2011); then quoting Davis v. 
FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 741 (2008); and then quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 56)). Likewise, the 
Government may not “determine for itself what speech and speakers are worthy of consid-
eration” by “taking the right to speak from some and giving it to others.” Citizens United v. 
FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 340-41 (2010). Finally, the Government may not limit contributions to 
prevent contributors from gaining “influence [over] or access [to]” government officials, 
because “[i]ngratiation and access . . . are not corruption.” Id. at 360; see also McCutcheon, 
134 S. Ct. at 1451 (“[T]he Government may not seek to limit the appearance of mere influ-
ence or access.”).  
 116. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26 (“[L]imit[ing] the actuality and appearance of corruption 
resulting from large individual financial contributions” is “a constitutionally sufficient 
justification” for base limits on contributions to candidates.). 
 117. Id. at 27. 
 118. Id.  
 119. Id. at 27-28.  
 120. Id. at 28.  
 121. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 391 (2000).  
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however, what exactly the government must prove in order to defend 
a particular contribution limit.122 There are many possible interpreta-
tions, but none is entirely satisfactory.   
 It may be that a contribution limit is justified if a particular type 
of transaction has any potential to corrupt a candidate. The Court’s 
precedents do not support such an interpretation, however. For ex-
ample, as discussed in the next Section,123 the Court has consistently 
held that the risk of corruption associated with independent expendi-
tures is too remote to warrant restricting them. Alternatively, the 
Court could implicitly be applying a threshold, requiring the govern-
ment to show that a certain percentage of instances of a particular 
type of transaction involves quid pro quo corruption or that some 
non-negligible number of such transactions has led to such corrup-
tion in the past. But the Court repeatedly has upheld contribution 
limits despite its recognition that the vast majority of even large con-
tributions do not involve corruption.124 Prohibiting a practice to pre-
vent corruption when the overwhelming majority of instances of such 
conduct are not corrupt eviscerates any pretention of “closely drawn” 
tailoring.   
 It appears that the Court instead might be applying an objective 
standard, asking whether a particular type of contribution, in the 
Court’s view, poses a reasonable likelihood of corrupting a candidate 
or officeholder. Such a standard places less weight on empirical evi-
dence and appears to turn primarily on the Court’s subjective intui-
tions about politics and politicians, making jurisprudence in this area 
unnecessarily subjective and unpredictable. Further, it is unclear 
what constitutes a “reasonable” or “unreasonable” likelihood of cor-
ruption or how a future court should go about attempting to make 
that determination. Relying on such an ad hoc approach, rather than 
more concrete principles, also tends to undermine the perceived legit-
imacy of the Court’s rulings in this highly charged and politicized  
area.125  
 These difficulties are even greater when attempting to weigh the 
government’s interest in combating “the appearance of corruption” 
posed by a particular type of contribution.126 Conceptually, apparent 
                                                                                                                                       
 122. See id. (“While Buckley’s evidentiary showing exemplifies a sufficient justification 
for contribution limits, it does not speak to what may be necessary as a minimum.”).  
 123. See infra Section III.C. 
 124. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 357 (2010) (“[R]estrictions on direct 
contributions are preventative, because few if any contributions to candidates will involve 
quid pro quo arrangements.”); see also McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1458 (2014).  
 125. Cf. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. 
L. REV. 1 (1959) (arguing that constitutional cases should rest on principles and reasoning 
that transcend immediate outcomes and generate consistent decisions).  
 126. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 27 (1976).  
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corruption may exist even in the absence of actual corruption. The 
Court has failed, however, to provide standards for determining the 
magnitude or validity of such concerns. For example, is the 
appearance of corruption to be determined based solely on the 
perspective of a member of the general public, someone familiar with 
all the details of the transaction at issue, or someone familiar  
with campaign finance law and First Amendment doctrine? The 
ability of individuals to contribute unlimited amounts of money  
to SuperPACs, 127  and of SuperPACs (like other PACs) to spend 
unlimited amounts of money on political advertisements, 128 
reasonably might be seen as potentially corrupting to a member of 
the public who is aware of neither the concept of an “independent 
expenditure” nor the Court’s view that such expenditures do not 
create a risk of corruption.129  
 Similarly, is the issue whether a reasonable person possibly could 
conclude that a particular transaction involves quid pro quo corrup-
tion, or that he likely would do so, or that a majority of the public 
would find the transaction questionable? The frustrating vagueness 
of the Court’s appearance-of-corruption standard allows it to effec-
tively determine the constitutionality of campaign finance laws based 
primarily on its intuitions and assumptions, rather than more con-
crete legislative facts susceptible to proof or falsification.   
 The Court’s subsequent rulings concerning contribution limits 
purport to follow Buckley. The vagueness of Buckley’s decision rule 
for determining the validity of contribution limits and the indetermi-
nacy of the legislative facts upon which it is based, however, have 
caused the Court to reach conflicting conclusions about different 
types of limits without clear differences in the underlying evidentiary 
records. The Court’s rulings concerning contribution limits appear to 
be based more on subjective ad hoc determinations than the underly-
ing legislative facts that Buckley deems dispositive.  
 This Section will focus on three examples: Nixon v. Shrink Mis-
souri Government PAC, which upheld state-level contribution lim-
its;130 McConnell v. FEC, which upheld federal limits on soft money 
contributions to state and local parties but invalidated a blanket pro-
hibition on contributions from minors;131 and McCutcheon v. FEC, 
which invalidated aggregate contribution limits.132  
                                                                                                                                       
 127. SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686, 689 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (en banc). 
 128. See FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 496-97 
(1985). 
 129. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47. 
 130. 528 U.S. 377, 381-82 (2000).  
 131. 540 U.S. 93, 164-67, 231 (2003). 
 132. 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1452, 1461 (2014). 
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 1.   Shrink Missouri 
 In Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, the Eighth Circuit 
had invalidated Missouri’s limits on contributions to candidates  
for certain state offices.133 Although Buckley had upheld the constitu-
tionality of contribution limits, the Eighth Circuit properly recog-
nized that this holding was not a pure interpretation of the Constitu-
tion, but rather was contingent upon legislative facts, including rec-
ord evidence concerning “perfidy . . . in federal campaign financing in 
1972.”134 The Eighth Circuit refused to “infer that [Missouri] state 
candidates for public office are corrupt or that they appear corrupt 
from the problems that resulted from undeniably large contributions 
made to federal campaigns over twenty-five years ago.”135 It therefore 
required the State to “prove that Missouri has a real problem with 
corruption or a perception thereof as a direct result of large campaign 
contributions.”136 
 The State’s only evidence, according to the court, was an affidavit 
of the senator who co-chaired the committee that enacted the contri-
bution limits. The affidavit offered his opinion that “there was the 
‘real potential to buy votes’ if the limits were not enacted, and that 
contributions greater than the limits ‘have the appearance of buying 
votes.’ ”137 The Eighth Circuit concluded that this evidence was insuf-
ficient as a matter of law to demonstrate that contribution limits 
would further the State’s interest in combatting corruption.138  
 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Buckley is “authority 
for comparable state regulation” of political contributions.139 Quoting 
extensively from Buckley, the Court held that Missouri’s contribution 
limits furthered the State’s interest in battling corruption.140 It de-
clared that “the dangers of large, corrupt contributions and the sus-
picion that large contributions are corrupt are neither novel nor im-
plausible.”141 It went on to opine that the senator’s affidavit, as well 
as some newspaper articles introduced in the district court (which 
the Eighth Circuit did not mention) discussing actions various gov-
ernment officials took that favorably impacted large contributors, 
                                                                                                                                       
 133. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC v. Adams, 161 F.3d 519, 520, 522-23 (8th Cir. 1998) (citing 
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 130.032.1(1)), rev’d sub nom. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377 
(2000). 
 134. Id. at 522. 
 135. Id.  
 136. Id.  
 137. Id.  
 138. Id.  
 139. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 382 (2000).  
 140. Id. at 386-90 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 15-16, 20-22, 24-28, 30 (1976)).  
 141. Id. at 391.  
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“substantiat[e]” concerns about corruption in Missouri.142 The Court 
concluded, “[T]here is little reason to doubt that sometimes large con-
tributions will work actual corruption of our political system, and no 
reason to question the existence of a corresponding suspicion among 
voters.”143   
 Buckley treated the validity of limits on contributions to federal 
candidates as a constitutional issue to be resolved in large part based 
on certain underlying legislative facts, most notably including the 
risk of actual or apparent corruption such contributions cause. Nixon, 
however, significantly downplayed the contingent nature of Buckley’s 
holding, treating contribution limits, in effect, as prima facie valid. 
The Court was largely unwilling to consider evidence concerning 
Missouri politics in particular or the remarkable differences in cir-
cumstances between present-day Missouri and the federal govern-
ment of a quarter-century earlier. Nor was the Court receptive to 
possible differences in public perception of federal corruption and 
Missouri politicians.  
 2.   McConnell 
 In McConnell v. FEC,144 the Court upheld the constitutionality of a 
provision in the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (“BCRA”) limiting 
“soft money” contributions to political parties.145 Soft money is a label 
applied to funds used by political parties to pay for something other 
than contributions to federal candidates, coordinated expenditures 
with federal candidates, or communications that clearly advocate the 
election or defeat of a federal candidate.146 Prior to BCRA, the most 
common uses of soft money were for activities aimed at state or  
local elections, voter registration drives, get-out-the-vote campaigns, 
generic party advertising, and issue advocacy. 147 During that pre-
BCRA era, federal contribution limits did not apply to soft money; 
political parties could accept unlimited amounts of such funds. BCRA 
effectively eliminated soft money; the Act provides that any funds 
that a national, state, or local political party uses in connection with 
a federal election must be raised in compliance with federal contribu-
tion limits.148    
                                                                                                                                       
 142. Id. at 393.  
 143. Id. at 395. 
 144. 540 U.S. 93 (2003). 
 145. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 101(a)-(b), 116 
Stat. 81, 82-86 (codified at 52 U.S.C. § 30125 (Supp. II 2014)).  
 146. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 123 (2003).  
 147. Id.; see also Bradley A. Smith, Soft Money, Hard Realities: The Constitutional 
Prohibition on a Soft Money Ban, 24 J. LEGIS. 179, 181-82 (1998).  
 148. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 § 323. 
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 The Court upheld BCRA’s extension of contribution limits to soft 
money,149 including section 323(b), which limits soft money contribu-
tions to state and local political party committees.150 The Court held 
that section 323(b) was “designed to foreclose” circumvention of  
limits on contributions to national political parties “by sharply curb-
ing state committees’ ability to use large soft-money contributions to 
influence federal elections.” 151  The Court pointed out that federal 
candidates and national parties sometimes “ask donors who have 
reached the limit on their direct contributions to donate to state 
committees.”152 It opined that “[t]here is at least as much evidence as 
there was in Buckley that such donations have the intent—and in at 
least some cases the effect—of gaining influence over federal office-
holders.”153 The Court went on to observe that it was “ ‘neither novel 
nor implausible,’ for Congress to conclude that . . . federal candidates 
would be just as indebted to these contributors as they had been  
to those who had formerly contributed to the national parties.”154 It 
later reiterated that “[c]ommon sense dictates” that federal candi-
dates would be grateful for soft money contributions to state parties 
to be used to subsidize voter registration or get-out-the-vote efforts 
that may benefit them.155  
 To the extent the Court relied on “common sense” rather than  
record evidence in reaching its conclusions, it may have improperly 
reduced the government’s burden in defending the constitutionality 
of laws that impinge upon First Amendment rights. This approach 
effectively shifts the burden to those challenging the law to demon-
strate that the Court’s “common sense” is wrong by proving a nega-
tive: that contribution limits do not give rise to a potential for corrup-
tion. It is unclear what evidence would be necessary to accomplish 
such a task, such as the absence of any bribery prosecutions based on 
contributions to state parties, or testimony from candidates as to the 
relative lack of importance of soft money contributions to state and 
local political parties.  
 Supporters of campaign finance reform should not necessarily  
embrace the Court’s use of “common sense” as a barometer for de-
termining the constitutionality of contribution limits, however. As 
discussed in the next Section, the Court’s intuitions have led it to 
conclude—in the apparent absence of empirical evidence—that inde-
                                                                                                                                       
 149. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 169, 173. 
 150. See Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 § 323(b). 
 151. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 161.  
 152. Id. at 164-65. 
 153. Id.  
 154. Id. at 165 (quoting Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 391 (2000)).  
 155. Id. at 167.  
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pendent expenditures categorically do not give rise to a risk of quid 
pro quo corruption.156 And even the McConnell Court’s common sense 
did not lead it to uniformly uphold restrictions on contributions.  
Another BCRA provision prohibited minors from contributing to  
candidates or political parties.157 McConnell held that this prohibition 
violated minors’ First Amendment rights.158 The government argued 
that the ban prevented parents from circumventing their contribu-
tion limits by funneling additional contributions through their chil-
dren.159 It had presented evidence in the district court of four in-
stances of parents doing so.160  
 The Supreme Court rejected this rationale on the grounds that the 
government offered “scant evidence” that such circumvention was 
actually occurring.161 It stated, “Absent a more convincing case of the 
claimed evil, this interest is simply too attenuated for § 318 to with-
stand heightened scrutiny.” 162  The Court also pointed out that 
BCRA’s prohibition on making a contribution in another person’s 
name already prohibits parents from contributing funds through 
their children.163  
 The Court’s unwillingness to recognize the potential for circum-
vention through minors’ contributions stands in stark contrast with 
its concern over soft money contributions to state and local parties. 
With both provisions, the government asked the Court to speculate 
that a lack of regulation could lead to corruption. The Court was will-
ing to assume that soft money contributions to state parties would 
cause federal officeholders to be grateful and lead to potential corrup-
tion164 but, as discussed below, refused to apply similar reasoning to 
independent expenditures.165 It was also unwilling to assume that 
contributors might route money through their children to circumvent 
contribution limits.166  
                                                                                                                                       
 156. See infra Section III.C. 
 157. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 318, 116 Stat. 81, 
109 (codified at 52 U.S.C. § 30126 (Supp. II 2014)). 
 158. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 231.  
 159. Id. at 232. 
 160. McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 717-18 (D.D.C. 2003) (opinion of Kollar-
Kotelly, J.), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 540 U.S. 93, 203 (2003).  
 161. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 232. 
 162. Id.  
 163. Id. (citing 2 U.S.C. § 441f (recodified at 52 U.S.C. § 30122 (Supp. II 2014))). The 
Court further held that a complete prohibition on contributions from minors was 
“overinclusive” and that more narrowly tailored means of preventing circumvention were 
available. Id.  
 164. Id. at 165. 
 165. See infra Section III.C. 
 166. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 232. 
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 The contrasts among these rulings arise in part from the indeter-
minacy of the decision rules the Court is applying. Neither Buckley 
nor its progeny clearly or specifically identify how “real” or “certain” 
a potential for corruption must be, the extent to which the govern-
ment must show that corruption of that type has occurred in the 
past, or the frequency with which it will occur. Moreover, the legisla-
tive facts underlying these holdings cannot definitively be ascer-
tained based on objective evidence. They unavoidably rest in sub-
stantial part on the Court’s subjective judgments about human na-
ture, tolerance for risk, and speculation about the future. Conse-
quently, the Court has flexibility to accept a relatively minimal show-
ing in one context, approving contribution limits on soft money con-
tributions to state and local parties, while insisting on a heightened 
showing in another context, by invalidating a prohibition on contri-
butions from minors. 
 3.   McCutcheon 
 Finally, in McCutcheon v. FEC, 167 the Supreme Court held that 
the risk of actual and apparent corruption was insufficient to support 
aggregate limits on the total amount that a person may contribute to 
all candidates and political committees in an election cycle.168 The 
Court reasoned that, so long as each contribution a person makes is 
under the statutory base limit, there is no reason to effectively limit 
the number of such non-corrupting contributions she may make 
through an aggregate limit.169  
 The government also had failed to show that contributors would 
likely try to circumvent the base limit on contributions to a particular 
candidate by making large contributions to numerous other entities 
that would, in turn, contribute to that candidate. In one of the most 
critical sentences in the opinion, the Court stated, “[T]here is not the 
same risk of quid pro quo corruption or its appearance when money 
flows through independent actors to a candidate, as when a donor 
contributes to a candidate directly.”170 The Court did not cite any evi-
dence, whether anecdotal, expert, or even polling, to support this crit-
ical assumption. Rather, it explained that when a contributor pro-
vides funds to a PAC, and the PAC in turn decides to contribute 
                                                                                                                                       
 167. 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014).  
 168. Id. at 1456, invalidating 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(3) (2012) (recodified at 52 
U.S.C. § 30116(a)(3) (Supp. II 2014)). 
 169. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1452. 
 170. Id.  
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that money to a candidate, “such action occurs at the [PAC’s] discre-
tion—not the donor’s,” because the donor “must by law cede control 
over the funds.”171  
 The Court recognized that when a donor makes the maximum 
permissible contribution to many of a party’s candidates, “all mem-
bers of the party or supporters of the cause may benefit, and the 
leaders of the party or cause may feel particular gratitude.”172 It did 
not believe, however, that “such shared interest, standing alone,” 
presents “an opportunity for quid pro quo corruption.” 173  While 
McCutcheon was correctly decided, it is another example of how the 
boundary between legal holdings and findings of legislative fact is 
blurry, and many legislative facts the Court must ascertain are diffi-
cult to establish. 
 4.   Reconsidering the Role of Legislative Facts in Contribution 
Limits 
 The precedents discussed throughout this Section establish many 
principles. Contribution limits generally are permissible because 
they impose only limited restrictions on association and minimal  
restrictions on speech.174 Limits on soft money contributions to politi-
cal parties are constitutional,175 aggregate contribution limits176 and 
prohibitions on contributions by minors 177  are not. Each of these  
assertions appears to be a pure statement of law directly interpreting 
the Constitution but, in truth, each rests on factual assertions and 
assumptions that, at least in concept, remain subject to challenge in 
future cases. When courts, commentators, and counsel either assert 
these propositions divorced from the facts upon which they are  
contingent, or instead quote an opinion’s factual premises as if they 
were binding legal rulings, they subtly misrepresent and, over time, 
undermine the contingent nature of these holdings.  
 This pastiche of rulings concerning contribution limits stems in 
part from the vagueness of the underlying decision rule the Court is 
purporting to apply. The Court has held that contributions may be 
limited to prevent corruption, but it has not adopted a clear or con-
sistent position on whether the corruption must be proven or may be 
merely assumed; the frequency, likelihood, and extent of corruption 
necessary to warrant such restrictions; when other statutory re-
                                                                                                                                       
 171. Id.  
 172. Id. at 1461. 
 173. Id.  
 174. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1976).  
 175. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 169, 173 (2003). 
 176. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1434.  
 177. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 231-32. 
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strictions may be deemed sufficient to prevent such corruption; or  
the perspective from which an act must be viewed to determine 
whether it appears corrupt. Accordingly, it is difficult for a litigant to 
determine in advance of a ruling whether any collection of evidence is 
sufficient to make a restriction constitutional. Greater specificity in 
the decision rule would help future courts base their rulings on legis-
lative facts rather than assumptions or intuition.   
C.   Independent Expenditures 
 As discussed earlier, nearly a half-century of campaign finance 
case law is built upon Buckley’s dichotomy between contributions and 
independent expenditures. That dichotomy, in turn, is based on the 
Court’s assertion in Buckley that independent expenditures do not 
give rise to a constitutionally cognizable risk of corruption.178 Buckley 
declared that the “absence of prearrangement and coordination of  
an expenditure with the candidate or his agent not only undermines  
the value of the expenditure to the candidate, but also alleviates  
the danger that expenditures will be given as a quid pro quo for  
improper commitments from the candidate.”179 A substantial chunk of 
modern campaign finance law rests upon this seemingly unassuming 
premise.  
 Based on this assertion, the Court consistently has struck down 
limits on independent expenditures by nearly every type of speaker 
that has come before it, including individuals, 180  PACs,181  political 
parties182 and, in its much-maligned decision in Citizens-United,183 
corporations.184 Similarly, the overwhelming majority of circuits has 
                                                                                                                                       
 178. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 47 (1976).  
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. at 51 (holding that FECA’s “independent expenditure limitation is 
unconstitutional under the First Amendment”). But see Bluman v. FEC, 800 F. Supp. 2d 
281, 288 & n.3 (D.D.C. 2011) (three-judge court) (upholding law prohibiting foreign nation-
als other than lawful permanent residents from making independent expenditures in con-
nection with federal elections), aff’d without opinion, 132 S. Ct. 1087 (2012). 
 181. FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 496 (1985) 
(“[T]he PACs’ [independent] expenditures are entitled to full First Amendment protec-
tion . . . .”).  
 182. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 614 (1996) (holding 
that a political party’s independent expenditures “fall[] within the scope of the Court’s 
precedents that extend First Amendment protection to independent expenditures”).  
 183. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); see, e.g., Lili Levi, Plan B for 
Campaign-Finance Reform: Can the FCC Help Save American Politics After Citizens 
United?, 61 CATH. U. L. REV. 97, 98 (2011); William Alan Nelson II, Buying the Electorate: 
An Empirical Study of the Current Campaign Finance Landscape and How the Supreme 
Court Erred in Not Revisiting Citizens United, 61 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 443, 446 (2013).  
 184. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 365 (invalidating prohibition on corporate 
independent expenditures because “the Government may not suppress political speech on 
the basis of the speaker’s corporate identity”); see also FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 
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held that political committees that solely make independent expendi-
tures (colloquially referred to as “SuperPACs”) have a First Amend-
ment right to accept unlimited contributions.185 As the D.C. Circuit 
explained: 
 In light of the [Supreme] Court’s holding as a matter of law 
that independent expenditures do not corrupt or create the  
appearance of quid pro quo corruption, contributions to groups 
that make only independent expenditures also cannot corrupt or 
create the appearance of corruption. The Court has effectively held 
that there is no corrupting “quid” for which a candidate might in 
exchange offer a corrupt “quo.” 
 . . . .  
  . . . [T]he government can have no anti-corruption interest  
in limiting contributions to independent expenditure-only  
organizations.186  
Some courts have gone even further, allowing political committees 
that make political contributions to establish separate, segregated 
accounts (“Carey accounts”) that may accept unlimited contributions 
to fund their independent expenditures.187  
 Thus, both SuperPACs and Carey accounts—and the hundreds  
of millions of dollars in political spending for which they  
account188—owe their existence to the Buckley Court’s assertion that 
independent expenditures cannot be corrupting because the “ab-
                                                                                                                                       
479 U.S. 238, 263 (1986) (holding that “restriction of independent spending is 
unconstitutional as applied to” certain non-profit corporations).  
 185. SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686, 689 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (holding that 
contribution limits are “unconstitutional as applied to individuals’ contributions” to “an 
unincorporated nonprofit association” that “intends to engage in express advocacy” and will 
“operate exclusively through ‘independent expenditures’ ”); see Wis. Right to Life State 
PAC v. Barland, 664 F.3d 139, 154 (7th Cir. 2011) (“[T]here is no valid governmental 
interest sufficient to justify imposing limits on fundraising by independent-expenditure 
organizations.”); Long Beach Area Chamber of Commerce v. City of Long Beach, 603 F.3d 
684, 696 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Nor has the City shown that contributions to the Chamber PACs 
for use as independent expenditures raise the specter of corruption or the appearance 
thereof.”); N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake, 525 F.3d 274, 293 (4th Cir. 2008) (“[I]t is 
‘implausible’ that contributions to independent expenditure political committees are 
corrupting.”); see also N.Y. Progress & Prot. PAC v. Walsh, 733 F.3d 483, 487 n.1 (2d Cir. 
2013) (“[T]he threat of quid pro quo corruption does not arise when individuals make 
contributions to groups that engage in independent spending on political speech.”).  
 186. SpeechNow.org, 599 F.3d at 694-96 (emphasis added).  
 187. See Carey v. FEC, 791 F. Supp. 2d 121, 126-27, 131 (D.D.C. 2011) (three-judge 
panel); see also Republican Party v. King, 741 F.3d 1089, 1096-97 (10th Cir. 2013); 
Thalheimer v. City of San Diego, No. 09-CV-2862-IEG (BGS), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6563, 
at *38-40 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 2012).  
 188. 2012 Outside Spending, by Super PAC, OPENSECRETS.ORG, 
https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/summ.php?cycle=2012&chrt=V&type=S (last 
visited Apr. 1, 2016) (noting that 1310 SuperPACs spent a total of $609,417,654 in 2012); 
see also Richard Briffault, Super PACs, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1644, 1672-75 (2012).  
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sence of . . . coordination” between the candidate and the entity 
making the expenditure “undermines” its value to that candidate.189 
On its face, this appears to be a factual assertion. Yet, as others have 
recognized,190 Buckley did not provide any empirical basis for this as-
sertion, and it has seldom been subject to empirical analysis or re-
consideration in later cases. Like the Court’s view in McCutcheon 
that an officeholder cannot be corrupted by contributions to candi-
dates other than himself,191 its conclusion in Buckley concerning in-
dependent expenditures’ lack of corrupting influence appears to be a 
matter of intuition, rather than evidence. And, through repetition, 
this intuition has hardened into a principle that, in the words of the 
en banc D.C. Circuit, is now deemed settled “as a matter of law.”192  
 If the Court wished to interpret the First Amendment as categori-
cally prohibiting restrictions on independent expenditures, it should 
have framed that conclusion as a direct interpretation of the Consti-
tution itself: a true matter of law.193 Buckley’s approach, however, 
presents the right to engage in unlimited independent expenditures 
as a contingent assertion. If a future litigant were able to demon-
strate that independent expenditures can corrupt politicians, the 
right to make such expenditures without limit would evaporate. But, 
as with the Court’s decision rule concerning contribution limits,194 it 
has never explained the nature of the factual showing that would be 
necessary to demonstrate the corrupting potential of independent 
expenditures.  
 Thus, putting aside the substance of the Court’s doctrine concern-
ing independent expenditures, Buckley’s reasoning concerning inde-
pendent expenditures is the worst of all worlds for all sides. For sup-
porters of unlimited independent expenditures, Buckley frames that 
right in unnecessarily precarious terms. If Buckley is read literally, 
the right does not exist as a matter of pure constitutional interpreta-
tion, but rather is contingent upon the Court’s factual belief that in-
dependent expenditures are categorically unable to create a risk of 
actual or apparent corruption. Even if the Court respects stare deci-
sis and does not change its interpretation of the First Amendment, 
the right to make unlimited independent expenditures can be over-
turned if a future litigant convinces the Court that they pose some 
unspecified risk of actual or apparent corruption. And as independent 
                                                                                                                                       
 189. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 47 (1976).  
 190. See, e.g., Gorod, supra note 25, at 30; Allison Orr Larsen, Factual Precedents, 162 
U. PA. L. REV. 59, 63, 94-95 (2013).  
 191. See McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1450-52 (2014). 
 192. SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686, 695 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (en banc).  
 193. Cf. Larsen, supra note 190, at 109 (arguing that the Court was “not really finding 
facts” but rather “building bright line rules”).  
 194. See supra Section III.B.  
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expenditures exceed a billion dollars per election cycle,195 it is virtual-
ly inevitable that, at the very least, some sort of apparent quid pro 
quo incident will eventually occur.   
 For opponents of independent expenditures, Buckley presents a 
tantalizing target that somehow is always hovering just out of reach. 
Buckley—as interpreted and applied in Citizens United196—suggests 
that the Constitution would not protect the right to engage in unlim-
ited independent expenditures if they were shown to give rise to ac-
tual or apparent quid pro quo corruption. Yet the Court has never 
clarified what, exactly, a litigant must demonstrate to satisfy this 
standard. How many apparent quid pro quo arrangements must be 
proven for independent expenditures to become subject to regulation? 
Would public opinion polls about the appearance of corruption be suf-
ficient? Opinion testimony from current or former members of Con-
gress?  
 To the extent courts such as the D.C. Circuit declare that inde-
pendent expenditures are not corrupting as a matter of law,197 they 
confuse legislative facts with legal holdings. Such confusion elevates 
a holding that purports to be contingent upon certain underlying 
facts into a direct interpretation of the Constitution itself. The Court 
itself treated its factual findings about independent expenditures as 
if they were legally binding holdings protected by stare decisis in 
American Tradition Partnership v. Bullock.198 The plaintiffs in Bull-
ock filed a lawsuit in Montana state court, challenging a Montana 
law that prohibited corporations from making independent expendi-
tures concerning state candidates or political parties.199 The State 
introduced affidavits and deposition excerpts in defense of the ban 
describing Montana’s long history of corruption.200 In the early 1900s, 
corporations had spent tremendous sums of money to influence state 
elections and officeholders, and effectively controlled state govern-
ment.201  
 The State’s evidence showed that contemporary Montana re-
mained subject to outside corporate influence because “the resources 
upon which its economy depends . . . depend upon distant mar-
kets.” 202  One affidavit explained that “even small expenditures of 
                                                                                                                                       
 195. See Michael S. Kang, The Year of the Super PAC, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1902, 
1916 (2013). 
 196. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 359-61 (2010).  
 197. See, e.g., SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686, 694 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (en banc). 
 198. 132 S. Ct. 2490, 2491 (2012).  
 199. Id. (citing MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-35-227(1) (2011)).  
 200. W. Tradition P’ship v. Att’y Gen., 271 P.3d 1, 6-7 (Mont. 2011), rev’d sub nom. Am. 
Tradition P’ship v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490 (2012).  
 201. Id. at 8-9. 
 202. Id. at 9.  
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money can impact Montana elections.”203 Due to the state’s small 
population, campaigns in Montana are “marked by person-to-person 
contact and a low cost of advertising compared to other states.”204  
Allowing unlimited corporate independent expenditures would shift 
the emphasis of campaigns to fundraising.205 Former state officials 
also testified that, because they had funded their statewide cam-
paigns with a total of only a few hundred dollars, they “could have 
been derailed by an opposing expenditure of even a couple of thou-
sand dollars.”206 
 Based on this evidence, the Montana Supreme Court upheld the 
state’s ban on independent expenditures by corporations.207 Although 
Citizens United had been decided only the year before, the court con-
cluded that it was not controlling, since its holding was based on the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s factual findings concerning federal elections 
and the evidence before it.208 The Montana Supreme Court empha-
sized, “[T]he factual record before a court is critical to determining 
the validity of a governmental provision restricting speech.”209   
 The Montana Supreme Court concluded that the State had 
“unique and compelling interests” in prohibiting corporate independ-
ent expenditures.210  It held, “Issues of corporate influence, sparse 
population, dependence upon agriculture and extractive resource de-
velopment, location as a transportation corridor, and low campaign 
costs make Montana especially vulnerable to continued efforts of cor-
porate control to the detriment of democracy and the republican form 
of government.”211  
 It is doubtful that the evidence before the court was sufficient to 
justify a prohibition on independent expenditures by corporations. 
Some of the evidence the court relied upon involved the corrupting 
effect of large campaign contributions and therefore was marginally, 
if at all, relevant to corporate independent expenditures.212 Similarly, 
it does not appear that any of the examples of bribery the court  
discussed involved independent expenditures. Much of the opinion 
                                                                                                                                       
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. at 10. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id.  
 207. Id. at 13.   
 208. Id. at 6 (“Citizens United was decided under its facts or lack of facts . . . .”).  
 209. Id.  
 210. Id. at 11.  
 211. Id.  
 212. See, e.g., id. at 10 (explaining evidence that “voters were concerned that they 
‘didn’t really count’ in the political process unless they can make a material financial 
contribution”); id. (“[Three] of [four] Americans believe that campaign contributions affect 
judicial decisions in states where judges are elected.”).  
2016]  CONTINGENT CONSTITUTIONALITY 713 
 
focused more on concerns about corporate “influence” over Montana 
elections and “control” of state government213 than specific quid pro 
quo corruption, which the U.S. Supreme Court has held is the only 
valid basis for restricting political spending.214 The Montana Supreme 
Court also feared that unlimited independent expenditures would 
reduce voters’ interest and willingness to participate in the political 
process.215 Such concerns appear completely speculative and, in any 
event, are not grounds for limiting First Amendment activities.  
 Despite the shortcomings of the Montana Supreme Court’s opin-
ion, it properly recognized that Buckley’s and Citizens United’s hold-
ings concerning independent expenditures were not matters of pure 
constitutional interpretation, but rather were contingent on certain 
legislative facts. And the Montana Supreme Court believed that the 
State had established that different legislative facts existed concern-
ing Montana elections, thereby warranting restrictions on corporate 
independent expenditures in Montana that may be unconstitutional 
elsewhere, under different circumstances.  
 The U.S. Supreme Court reversed in a terse, one-paragraph, 5-4 
decision.216 It noted that Citizens United had invalidated a federal 
law that was “similar” to Montana’s on the grounds that “political 
speech does not lose First Amendment protection simply because its 
source is a corporation.”217 The Court held that “[t]here can be no  
serious doubt” that “the holding of Citizens United applies to the 
Montana state law.”218 It added that Montana’s arguments “either 
were already rejected in Citizens United, or fail to meaningfully  
distinguish that case.”219 Four Justices strenuously dissented, point-
ing out that Citizens United should not “bar the Montana Supreme 
Court’s finding, made on the record before it, that independent  
expenditures by corporations did in fact lead to corruption or the  
appearance of corruption in Montana.”220 
 The Bullock majority exemplifies the Court’s careless treatment of 
legislative facts in campaign finance cases. If the Court wished to 
categorically preclude any governmental entity from limiting inde-
pendent expenditures as a matter of law, without regard to the exist-
ence of extrinsic facts, then it should have framed its conclusion in 
                                                                                                                                       
 213. Id. at 9-10.   
 214. See McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1450-51 (2014); Citizens United v. FEC, 
558 U.S. 310, 340-41, 359-61 (2010).  
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Buckley and Citizens United as a purely legal assertion, rather than 
a factually contingent holding. If, instead, an entity’s First Amend-
ment right to engage in unlimited independent expenditures hinges 
on the existence or absence of certain facts, the Court should be 
clearer and more specific about what a litigant must establish to sat-
isfy the Court’s standard, and more willing to examine future liti-
gants’ factual records.  
 As discussed above with regard to contributions,221 it is unclear 
what evidence either a supporter of unlimited independent expendi-
tures or a governmental entity seeking to regulate them must adduce 
to establish whether such expenditures by particular entities or in 
certain elections may lead to actual or apparent corruption. Would 
public opinion polls be sufficient? How much, if any, background 
must people be given about the distinctions among contributions,  
coordinated expenditures, and independent expenditures before  
being polled? Would testimony from former government officials be 
sufficient? Can the Court draw important inferences from evidence 
that government officials have acted favorably toward individuals or 
entities who had made independent expenditures supporting their 
candidacies? The Bullock Court’s approach, which effectively pre-
cludes litigants from demonstrating that independent expenditures 
can give rise to actual or apparent corruption under certain circum-
stances, improperly disregards the contingent nature of Buckley’s 
and Citizens United’s holdings.  
 Above all, the Court must avoid allowing a litigant to attempt to 
establish a legislative fact through definitional sophistry. Buckley 
held that independent expenditures cannot give rise to a risk of cor-
ruption because, by definition, they do not involve “prearrangement 
and coordination” between the speaker and a candidate.222 The Court, 
in large part, defined away the possibility of corruption. Under the 
Court’s view, if Congress were to redefine “contribution” as the trans-
fer of funds to a candidate for reasons unrelated to a quid pro quo 
transaction, then a contribution could not, by definition, give rise to a 
risk of corruption, either. Money given to a candidate as part of a 
bribe or other corrupt quid pro quo arrangement would be excluded 
from the definition of “contribution.” If the Court wishes to continue 
determining the constitutionality of restrictions on First Amendment 
activities based on the likelihood they might involve actual or appar-
ent corruption, then it cannot allow the risk of corruption to be simp-
ly defined out of existence.   
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IV.   CONCLUSION 
 The judiciary—the Supreme Court in particular—has paid insuffi-
cient attention to the critical role of legislative facts in its constitu-
tional holdings, particularly in campaign finance jurisprudence. Most 
basically, in discussing precedents, courts sometimes fail to distin-
guish between holdings that are pure statements of law, based solely 
on the Constitution itself, and those that are contingent upon under-
lying legislative facts. When factually contingent holdings get repeat-
ed in later cases, divorced from their underlying factual premises, 
they appear to be statements of law subject to stare decisis and some-
times are treated as such. Moreover, when a court treats a contingent 
holding as binding without assessing the continued accuracy of the 
underlying facts, it affords the holding improperly strong binding 
force. At least in theory, both legislative facts and legal holdings that 
are contingent upon them should be subject to challenge in future 
litigation, in which the litigants may compile a very different eviden-
tiary record, without regard to stare decisis.223  
 In campaign finance cases, the Court also has paid inadequate 
attention to whether the legislative facts upon which its decision 
rules are based are reasonably susceptible to meaningful proof. Many 
of the Court’s standards are far too vague, giving litigants scant 
guidance as to how they can be satisfied. Such indeterminacy leaves 
courts free to resolve important constitutional questions based pri-
marily on intuition, reaching conclusions that can be both difficult to 
predict and reconcile with each other.  
 These are not partisan critiques. Few people find current cam-
paign finance law completely satisfactory. In some respects, paying 
greater attention to the role of legislative facts in the Court’s cam-
paign finance jurisprudence may lead to greater constitutional pro-
tection. The Court may conclude, for example, that it has underesti-
mated the extent to which contributions constitute a form of constitu-
tionally protected speech. In other respects, it may lead to reduced 
protection; for example, courts may find themselves more open to 
considering evidence (if it exists) of actual or apparent quid pro quo 
corruption from independent expenditures. At a minimum, greater 
focus on the issue can lead to more coherent, predictable, and per-
haps even persuasive rulings.  
 More generally, focusing on the factually contingent nature  
of many constitutional rulings offers an exciting and potentially un-
settling perspective on constitutional law. The need to reduce consti-
tutional law to hornbook principles, treatises, and outlines often ab-
stracts away from its true, much more complex nature. Principles of 
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constitutional law that appear established—at least unless the Court 
changes its interpretation of the Constitution—instead depend upon 
certain facts about the world. Those facts might not have been ade-
quately proven in a prior case or may be subject to new or different 
evidence in future cases. Focusing on the factually contingent nature 
of constitutional rulings, rather than their legal holdings alone, is 
like perceiving what appears to be a solid block of wood instead as a 
collection of atoms, separated by gulfs of space. What appears to be 
definitive is, upon closer perception, contingent; what appears to be 
an assertion of law is, upon closer analysis, largely factual. Such 
shifts in focus can lead to illuminating insights, even when we  
already know that such complexity is lying just beneath the surface.  
 
